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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LA.w-VALmITY oF Nnw YoRK STATUTE SETTING OUT MOTORISTS' lMPLIBD CONSENT TO CHEMICAL TESTS FOR
INTOXICATION-The State of New York has approved a statute, to go
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into effect July 1, 1953, which stipulates that any person who operates a motor vehicle or motorcycle in the state shall be deemed to have
given his consent to chemical tests of his breath, blood, urine, or saliva
for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood.1 If
such a person refuses to allow the tests, they will not be made, but the
commissioner shall revoke his license or permit to drive, including the
nonresident operating privilege. This is the first statute of its type and
merits attention as a possible solution to the constitutional problems
surrounding the extraction of evidence from persons by compulsion,
particularly evidence in the form of bodily substances. It is evident that
the statute came into being and was drafted with these problems in
mind. These constitutional problems have become extremely acute
since the United States Supreme Court entered the field in Rochin v.
California. 2 This case leaves little doubt that the methods which the
states use to obtain evidence will be subject to closer scrutiny in the
future than they have been in the past.
Chemical tests are used in forty-two states to determine the state of
intoxication of the person tested. Only fourteen of these states have
legislation on the subject and this legislation applies only to the admissibility of the tests as evidence after they have been taken. At the
present time no state has legislation covering the manner of taking the
tests. The New York legislature was not concerned with the reliability
of the tests, for that is well established; nor was it concerned with the
1 "The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact
as follows:
"Sec. I. The vehicle and traffic law is hereby amended by inserting therein a new
section, to be section seventy-one-a, to read as follows:
"Section 71-a. Chemical tests. 1. Any person who operates a motor vehicle or
motorcycle in this state shall be deemed to have given his consent to a chemical test of
his breath, blood, urine, or saliva for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of
his blood provided that such test is administered at the direction of a police officer having
reasonable grounds to suspect such person of driving in an intoxicated condition. If such
person refuses to submit to such chemical test the test shall not be given but the commissioner shall revoke his license or permit to drive and any nomesident operating privilege.
"2. Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of such test shall be
made available to him.
"3. Only a duly licensed physician acting at the request of a police office can withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content therein. This limitation
shall not apply to the taking of a urine, saliva or breath specimen.
"4. The person tested shall be permitted to have a physician of his own choosing
administer a chemical test in addition to the one administered at the direction of the police
office.
"Sec. 2. This act shall take effect July first, nineteen hundred fifty-three." McKinney's Session Law News of New York 1167 (May 25, 1953). N.Y. Reg. Sess. 1953,
c. 854, approved, April 19, 1953.
·
2 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205 (1952).
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admissibility into evidence of the results of the tests, for that has already
been covered by the Vehicle and Traffic Law of the state.3 The problem was whether or not the tests could be compelled. In 1941 the attorney general of the state submitted an opinion that until the legislature
granted more specific authority the police should not use compulsion
or bodily force in taking the tests. 4 This opinion has apparently prevented compelling the tests in the state up to the time of the present
statute, for in New York, to date, no reported case has decided whether
a chemical test could be given over the objection of the defendant.
The Joint Legislative Committee on Motor Vehicle Problems of New
York, in studying the problem of controlling drunken drivers on New
Yark highways prior to the passage of the present act, noted that the
coverage of the law in New York was inadequate.5 The 1941 opinion
of the attorney general, the lack of legislative authority, and the various constitutional limitations prevented an effective control of drunken
driving. Persons were refusing to submit to the tests too frequently,
and without such scientific tests as evidence at the forthcoming trial
it was extremely difficult to obtain a conviction. Thus potentially
dangerous drivers were being returned again and again to the highways. Many cities in the state use the tests with considerable success,
but many also refused to use them because they felt they lacked authority to compel the tests. The situation had reached such a point that
it became obvious that further means would have to be taken by the
legislature to effect better prevention of drunken driving on the state's
highways. The legislature was faced with the possibility of requiring
directly submission to the tests, with the attendant constitutional dangers presented by such a course, or by providing some alternative solution which would take potentially dangerous drivers off the highways
without raising constitutional questions.
The constitutional objection to the compulsion of the tests that is
most often raised is that it violates the privilege against self-incrimination. The Fifth Amendment provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." This provision is applicable only in federal proceedings,6 but all states have
similar provisions.7 In Holt v. United States8 the Supreme Court,
N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law, §70(5).
Report of the Attorney General (New York) 143-146 (1941).
McKinney's Session Law Service of New York (March 25, 1953) pp. A-166-182
at A-170, A-174.
6 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S.Ct. 14 (1908).
7New York Const., art. I, §6.
s 218 U.S. 245 at 252-253, 31 S.Ct. 2 (1910).
3

4
5
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speaking through Justice Holmes, said "the prohibition of compelling
a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may
be material...." This distinction between testimonial and real evidence has generally been followed by the courts in this country, which
have admitted into evidence the results of chemical tests over the selfincrimination objection.9 The tests have been likened to the processes
of fingerprinting and photography,10 and to routine physical examinations of the body of the accused. 11 In Ash v. State12 the accused was
forced to submit to an enema when it was shown that he had swallowed
stolen rings, and it was held that the privilege against self-incrimination
was not violated. And in State 'll. Cram13 the taking of blood from an
unconscious person was held not to violate the privilege. However, in
Apodaca v. State14 it was held that the taking of a urine test for intoxication under compulsion violated the privilege. Aside from this
Texas case and the dicta in a few others, especially the concurring opinions of Justices Black and Douglas in the Rochin case, there is very
little authority to sustain the proposition that compulsory submission
to a chemical test for intoxication is a violation of the privilege.15 The
language of the cases and the opinion of legal scholars definitely favor
the view that the privilege offers no protection to a person from whom a
body B.uid or breath specimen has been obtained under compulsion.16
However, other constitutional problems are raised by Rochin v.
California. 17 In that case, state officers, having some information that
petitioner was selling narcotics, forced their way into his bedroom; when
9 State v. Alexander, 7 N.J. 585, 83 A. (2d) 441 (1951); Block v. People, (Colo.
1952) 240 P. (2d) 512, cert. den. 343 U.S. 978, 72 S.Ct. 1076 (1952).
10 People v. Sallow, 100 Misc. 447, 165 N.Y.S. 915 (1917); Shaffer v. United States,
24 App. D.C. 417 (1904).
11 McFarland v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1945) 150 F. (2d) 593.
12139 Tex. Crim. 420, 141 S.W. (2d) 341 (1940).
13 176 Ore. 577, 160 P. (2d) 283 (1945).
14 140 Tex. Crim. 593, 146 S.W. (2d) 381 (1940).
16 Booker v. Cincinnati, 5 Ohio Op. 433 (1936) (urinalysis); State v. Benson, 230
Iowa 1168, 300 N.W. 275 (1941) (blood test).
1 6 State v. Werling, 234 Iowa 1109, 13 N.W. (2d) 318 (1944) (blood test for intoxication); State v. Nutt, 78 Ohio App. 336, 65 N.E. (2d) 675 (1946) (urine test
for intoxication); see Shanks v. State, 185 Md. 437, 45 A. (2d) 85, 163 A.L.R. 931
(1945); 8 WmMoRll, EvroENCB, 3d ed., §2265 (1940); Morgan, "The Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination," 34 MINN. L. Rllv. 1 at 38 (1949); Ladd and Gibson, "The MedicoLegal Aspects of the Blood Test to Determine Intoxication," 24 IowA L. Rllv. 191 (1939);
the AL.I. Model Code of Evidence, Rule 205, provides that no person has a privilege
to refuse to furnish or to permit the taking of samples of body fluids or substances for
analysis.
11 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205 (1952).
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petitioner was asked about two capsules on a bedside table, he seized
and swallowed them. A struggle to recover the capsules ensued. When
the struggle proved unsuccessful he was handcuffed and taken to a
hospital, under illegal arrest, and an emetic solution was forced into
his stomach against his will which caused him to vomit the capsules.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the California Supreme
Court and held that the admission of the capsules into evidence, in the
trial for illegal possession of narcotics, was a violation of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Frankfurter, delivering
the opinion of the Court, said that the limitations imposed by the
amendment are not restrictions upon the power of the states to define
crime, except where federal authority has pre-empted the field, but
" ... restriction upon the manner in which the states may enforce their
penal codes." Quoting earlier language of Justice Cardozo, he then
considered constitutional guarantees for those personal immunities
"... so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental." In deciding what these fundamental immunities are, Frankfurter stressed the point that the Court should look to
the "decencies of civilized conduct" and not to some personal standard.
Finally, deciding that violation of such "decencies" had taken place in
the case under consideration, Frankfurter applied the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and said, " ... this course of proceeding
by agents of the government to obtain evidence is bound to offend even
hardened sensibilities. They are methods too close to the rack and the
screw to permit of constitutional differentiation." Justices Black and
Douglas concurred, but were opposed to the majority of the Court in
that they felt that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
should not be used to formulate ethereal concepts of fundamental justice enforceable against the states. They would hold that the introduction of evidence so obtained is a violation of the privilege against
self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, which privilege is embraced by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Thus the minority opinions of Black and Douglas raise the possibility of an objection to the chemical tests on the basis of a violation
of the privilege against self-incrimination. However, assuming that
the privilege does apply, authority indicates that it can be waived by
a driver's use of the state's highways. In People v. Rosenheimer,1 8 the
court said that in "operating a motor vehicle the operator exercises a
privilege which might be denied him, and not a right, and in a case
1s 208 N.Y. 115 at 121, 102 N.E. 530 (1913).
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of a privilege the legislature may prescribe on what conditions it shall
be exercised." It is beyond dispute that the privilege of using the highways is a qualified right, or privilege, subject to regulation by the state
under the police power.19 The state may make such regulations with
regard to use of its highways as it feels are reasonably necessary to protect the welfare and safety of those persons within its jurisdiction. A
primary type of statute in which the driver waives individual rights is
the "nonresident motorist" type,20 which provides that a nonresident
driver by the act of driving consents to service of process by mail through
a state officer in any cause arising through use of the highways. Statutes and ordinances which provide for the revocation of the privilege
to drive for non-compliance with these regulations have been consistently upheld against various constitutional attacks.21 The courts have
held that even if "hit and
statutes making it a felony for any person to leave the scene of an accident without reporting his name, address
and operator's license violate the privilege against self-incrimination, by
using the highways the driver has waived the right to claim privilege.22
The statute under consideration seems to be a logical extension of the
other types mentioned, and if there is any claim of self-incrimination
made it can be said that the person making the claim has waived the
privilege with regard to the chemical tests by his implied consent to
the tests obtained by reason of his use of the highways.
Though the privilege against self-incrimination, if here applicable,
is of a fundamental civil rights character, there is a great public interest
in highway safety, so that if the privilege is claimed, the loss of right
to drive is a reasonable compensating device. 23
The possibility of a constitutional objection, based on the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to compulsory chemical
tests for intoxication has been made quite real by the language of the
Rochin case. The danger of such an objection would arise in any instance where physical force of any kind was used, and it would be a
matter of conjecture as to how much force would be required to "offend

run"

19 Re Schuler, 167 Cal. 282, 139 P. 685 (1914); State v. Chandler, 131 Me. 262,
161 A. 148 (1932), 82 A.L.R. 1389 (1933); Ashland Transfer Co. v. State Tax Commission, 247 Ky. 144, 56 S.W. (2d) 691 (1932).
20Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878); 18 A.L.R. (2d) 544 (1951); Pawloski v.
Hess, 253 Mass. 478, 149 N.E. 122 (1925), affd. 274 U.S. 352, 47 S.Ct. 632 (1927);
57 A.L.R. 1218 (1928).
21125 A.L.R. 1459 at 1460 (1940).
22People v. Fodera, 33 Cal. App. 8, 164 P. 22 (1917); State v. Corron, 73 N.H.
434, 62 A. 1044 (1905).
23 Cf. N.Y. Const., art. I, §6, which provides that a public officer claiming the privilege shall be removed from office or employment.
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even hardened sensibilities" or offend "the decencies of civilized conduct." The New York legislature seems to have avoided this problem,
however, because, by the terms of the statute, they have not authorized
force to be used in any degree. If the accused does not submit to the
test, his operating privilege is revoked and that is all.
Another possible constitutional objection to the taking of the tests
under compulsion is that of unreasonable search and seizure. The issue
seldom arises, for at the time of the search and seizure the accused is
normally under lawful arrest and all jurisdictions hold that a search
and seizure under lawful arrest violates no law. The few cases so far
with regard to alcoholic tests in which unreasonable search and seizure
has been made an issue have held that there has been no violation.24
One court has held that taking a chemical test when the accused was
not under lawful arrest was an unreasonable search and seizure.2 5
However, in New York, as in most states, the question is an academic
one, for the federal rule that evidence obtained by unlawful search
and seizure is inadmissible26 does not apply to the states.27 In New
York the manner of acquisition of evidence is immaterial to the question
of admissibility.28
One :6.nal objection might be on the basis of the physician-patient
privilege. The privilege did not exist at common law; its existence and
extent depend on the state's statute. Where the physician does not
treat the patient for injuries received in the accident, but merely makes
the test, it has been held no violation of the privilege.29 In cases where
the physician both treated the accused for injuries and rendered the
test, the privilege was still held not to apply, under statutes similar to
the one in New York.30 It is highly improbable that the privilege could
be claimed successfully in New York, or elsewhere, for it is generally
held that the knowledge that the physicians gain by taking the tests
is not necessary to the successful discharge of the physician's duties in
the treatment of a patient.
24 State v. Cram, 176 Ore. 577, 160 P. (2d) 283 (1945); Novak v. District of Columbia, (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1946) 49 A. (2d) 88.
25 State v. Weltha, 288 Iowa 519, 292 N.W. 148 (1940).
26Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341 (1914).
27Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359 (1949).
2s People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
29 Racine v. Woiteshek, 251 Wis. 404, 29 N.W. (2d) 752 (1947).
30 The New York statute reads: "A person duly authorized to practice physics or
surgery, or dentistry, or a professional or registered nurse shall not be allowed to disclose
any information which he acquired in attending in a professional capacity, and which was
necessary to enable him to act in that capacity." N.Y. Civil Practice Act §352. Halon
v. Woodhouse, 113 Colo. 504, 160 P. (2d) 998 (1945); Richter v. Hoglund, (7th Cir.
1943) 132 F. (2d) 748.
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It would seem that the statute is constitutional in all respects, and
it cannot be doubted that it will rid the highways of New York of many
motorists menacing the safety not only of themselves but of all those
in their vicinity. It is a sound measure in the control of an increasingly
acute problem. It is predicted that other states will use this statute in
the future as a model for their own legislation.

Richard A. Shupe, S.Ed.

